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Federalism Limits on  
Non-Article III Adjudication 
F. Andrew Hessick* 
Abstract 
 
Although Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in 
the Article III courts, the Supreme Court has created a patchwork of excep-
tions permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate various disputes.  In 
doing so, the Court has focused on the separation of powers, concluding that 
these non-Article III adjudications do not unduly infringe on the judicial 
power of the Article III courts.  But separation of powers is not the only con-
sideration relevant to the lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication.  Article 
I adjudications also implicate federalism.  Permitting Article I tribunals 
threatens the role of state courts by expanding federal judicial power with-
out the constraints of Article III, and Article I tribunals are more likely than 
state or Article III courts to adjudicate disputes in ways that undermine state 
interests.  This Essay argues that these federalism considerations provide a 
sounder basis than current doctrine for some of the exceptions to Article III 
and they suggest ways that the exceptions to Article III should be modified.  
 
 * Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; J.D. 
Yale Law School; B.A. Dartmouth College.  Thanks to Carissa Hessick, Derek Muller, John Yoo, 
and the participants at Pepperdine’s symposium on Federalism: Past, Present, and Future for their 
helpful comments and questions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Su-
preme Court and inferior courts that Congress creates.1  Nevertheless, feder-
al courts have upheld the power of various so-called “Article I tribunals”2—
courts outside of Article III—to adjudicate disputes.3  In doing so, courts 
have focused on the separation of powers, concluding that these Article I ad-
judications do not unduly infringe on the judicial power of the Article III 
courts. 
But separation of powers is not the only consideration relevant to the 
lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication.  Article I adjudications also im-
plicate federalism by expanding the power of the federal government at the 
expense of the states.  Under our constitutional system, state courts are the 
default tribunals to resolve disputes.  They have general judicial power to 
resolve all lawsuits.  By contrast, Article III confers limited judicial power 
on the federal courts.  It extends the judicial power to only a small set of dis-
putes,4 and it constrains that power by limiting it to Article III judges who 
have been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,5 and who 
have life tenure and salary guarantees.6  Article I adjudication expands the 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 2. See generally James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Pow-
er of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004) (“Congress has often assigned disputes 
that appear to fall within the scope of the federal judicial power to Article I tribunals whose judges 
lack salary and tenure protections.  This practice encompasses a range of cases involving administra-
tive agencies, legislative courts, courts-martial, and territorial courts.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 3. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64–70 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion) (describing various exceptions permitting non-Article III courts to adjudicate), super-
seded by statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (2012), as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 
135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending federal judicial power to nine types of dis-
putes). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to . . . appoint . . . Judges of the [S]upreme Court . . . .”).  Although the text of 
the Constitution requires Senate confirmation only for the justices of the Supreme Court, the re-
quirement has been understood to apply to inferior judges as well.  See James E. Pfander, Removing 
Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1245 (2007).  Although that conclusion is hardly obvious, 
see Burke Shartel, Federal Judges—Appointment, Supervision, and Removal—Some Possibilities 
Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 523–29 (1930), I do not contest it here. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).  But see Pfander, 
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reach of federal judicial power.  Article I tribunals exercise judicial power, 
but they do not face the jurisdictional constraints imposed by Article III.7  
Moreover, permitting Article I adjudication expands the pool of federal ad-
judicators to Article I judges, who do not have the salary and tenure guaran-
tees of Article III and need not be confirmed by the Senate.8 
Aside from impinging on the role of state courts, Article I tribunals 
threaten the states because those tribunals are more likely than state or Arti-
cle III courts to adjudicate disputes in a way that undermines state interests.  
One reason for Article III’s salary and tenure guarantees is to reduce the risk 
that Article III judges will be beholden to federal officials whose interests 
may diverge from those of state officials.  Article I judges do not enjoy those 
same independence protections from federal officials.  They accordingly are 
more likely than Article III judges to interpret both state and federal law in a 
way that benefits the federal government at the expense of the states. 
This Essay argues that federalism should play a role in limiting Article I 
adjudications.  Part II provides background information.9  It describes the 
difference between Article III courts and Article I tribunals, as well as the 
exceptions to Article III that provide the basis for Article I adjudication.  As 
it states, courts have focused on separation of powers in recognizing these 
exceptions.  Part III discusses the federalism considerations implicated by 
Article I adjudication.10  Part IV turns from concepts to doctrine.11  It dis-
cusses how these federalism considerations relate to the current doctrinal ex-
ceptions to Article III.  It argues that federalism helps explain some of the 
exceptions to Article III, and it suggests how some of the exceptions should 
be modified.  Part V offers some preliminary thoughts on how we might re-
structure the law to avoid unlawful Article I adjudications.12 
 
supra note 2, at 646. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1 (identifying the nine types of disputes that Article III courts 
may adjudicate).  
 8. Pfander, supra note 2, at 646; see infra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12.  See infra Part V. 
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II. ARTICLE III AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one [S]upreme Court, and in such inferior Courts” that Congress 
creates.13  The Constitution requires that the judges of these courts be ap-
pointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.14  It also affords the 
judges of these courts with life tenure during good behavior and prohibits 
the reduction of their salary.15  These guarantees insulate Article III judges 
from elected officials and popular opinion so that judicial decisions are the 
product of an impartial application of the law instead of a desire to appease 
majority sentiment.16 
A literal reading of Article III establishes that only Article III courts 
may exercise the federal judicial power.17  But courts have not adopted a lit-
eral view of Article III.  They have recognized a handful of exceptions to 
Article III.  Under these exceptions, Congress may assign various disputes to 
Article I tribunals that are staffed by judges who need not be appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate, and who do not enjoy the salary 
and tenure guarantees of Article III.18  The most prominent exceptions are 
these: 
• Territorial exception—Article I tribunals may adjudicate dis-
putes in the territories of the United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and U.S. holdings in foreign countries.19  The Court has 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to . . . appoint . . . Judges of the [S]upreme Court . . . .”). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
 16. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institu-
tionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 969–72 (2002). 
 17. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 668 (“Under the literal interpretation of Article III, Congress 
can create inferior tribunals only in accordance with the requirements of Article III.”). 
 18. Id. at 646.  Although Congress may confer comparable statutory protections, id. at 721, it 
need not do so, and it often does not do so; if it does confer those protections, Congress can later 
revoke them at will.  See id. at 686–87. 
 19. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 65–66 & n.16 (1982) 
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (2012), as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. 
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); see generally William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Terri-
torial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions, 61 
MICH. L. REV. 467 (1963) (describing the territorial exception). 
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also relied on this exception to uphold Article I adjudications of 
disputes relating to Indian tribe membership.20 
• Military exception—The Court has recognized two military ex-
ceptions to Article III.  First, Article I courts martial can adjudi-
cate charges against service members for offenses committed 
while on duty.21  Second, Article I military commissions can 
adjudicate claims related to violations of laws of war.22 
• Public rights exception—The public rights exception is an ill-
defined exception that permits non-Article III adjudication of 
roughly three types of disputes: (1) suits brought by the United 
States in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights—rights 
held by the government in its sovereign capacity, such as the 
right to collect taxes;23 (2) suits by individuals to enforce their 
individual rights against the United States, such as individual 
claims against the government in the Court of Federal Claims;24  
and (3) suits between private parties seeking to enforce federal-
ly created rights related to a regulatory scheme.25 
• Consent—A non-Article III tribunal may adjudicate a dispute if 
the parties consent to that tribunal’s jurisdiction, so long as the 
Article III judiciary maintains some degree of supervision over 
the Article I tribunal.26 
• Catch-all—Even when one of the enumerated exceptions to Ar-
ticle III does not apply, a non-Article III tribunal may adjudi-
cate a dispute if the reasons that Congress assigned the adjudi-
cation to the Article I tribunal outweigh the degree of intrusion 
 
 20. Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 425 (1907). 
 21. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). 
 22. Martin S. Lederman, Of Spies, Saboteurs, and Enemy Accomplices: History’s Lessons for the 
Constitutionality of Wartime Military Tribunals, 105 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1564 (2017). 
 23. See Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 
CALIF. L. REV. 217, 217 n.4 (1984) (providing a brief overview of the meaning of “public rights”).  
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). 
 25. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 570 (1985) (“Congress has 
the power, under Article I, to authorize an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to 
allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without providing an Article 
III adjudication.”); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (describing the public rights exceptions). 
 26. See Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. Ct. at 1940. 
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on the Article III courts.27 
• Adjuncts—Article I tribunals may serve as adjuncts to Article 
III courts. Unlike the tribunals operating under the other excep-
tions to Article III, these adjuncts cannot render dispositive 
judgments.28  Instead, they may make preliminary determina-
tions of fact and law that form the basis for entry of judgment 
by the courts.29  Still, as the Court has long recognized, these 
adjunct findings may constitute exercise of judicial power if 
they form the basis for Article III judgments.30 
Together, these exceptions cover most types of disputes giving rise to 
litigation.31  Consequently, Article III courts conduct relatively little federal 
adjudication.32  The vast majority of federal adjudications occur before vari-
ous Article I decisionmakers, such as federal magistrate judges, bankruptcy 
courts, tax courts, military tribunals, and administrative agencies.33 
In justifying these exceptions, the Court has focused on whether Article 
I adjudication violates the separation of powers by infringing on the power 
of the Article III courts.34  That argument comes in different forms.  For 
some of the exceptions, the Court has argued that the determinations do not 
impinge on the power of the Article III courts because they do not involve 
the exercise of the judicial power at all.35  For others, the Court has argued 
 
 27. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (balancing “[1] the extent to which the ‘essential 
attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which 
the non-Article III forum exercises the [judicial power,] . . . [2] the origins and importance of the 
right to be adjudicated, and [3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of 
Article III.”). 
 28. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56–59 (1932). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 715, 725 (2018) (“[M]ost federal adjudication does not occur in Article III courts.  Instead, the 
bulk of federal litigation occurs before federal magistrate and bankruptcy judges and in various other 
Article I tribunals . . . .”). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); see also CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857–58 (concluding that separation of powers, 
and not federalism, limit Article I adjudications). 
 35. Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. Ct. at 1965 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the legislative 
and executive branches may dispose of public rights at will—including through non-Article III adju-
dications—an exercise of the judicial power is required ‘when the government want[s] to act authori-
tatively upon core private rights that had vested in a particular individual.’”) (quoting Caleb Nelson, 
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that, although the non-Article III tribunal is indeed exercising judicial pow-
er, the exercise of that power is constitutional because the tribunal is exercis-
ing some sort of non-Article III judicial power.36  A third justification is that, 
even when an Article I tribunal exercises judicial power assigned to the Ar-
ticle III courts, the exercise of that power is lawful if Congress’s reasons for 
assigning the claim to the Article I tribunal outweigh the intrusion on the 
power of the Article III courts.37 
III. FEDERALISM INTERESTS IMPLICATED BY ARTICLE I ADJUDICATION 
Although the courts have focused on separation of powers in determin-
ing the lawfulness of Article I adjudication,38 it is not the only consideration 
relevant to that determination.  Federalism is also important.  Federalism de-
scribes the allocation of power between the state and national govern-
ments.39  The Constitution delegates limited enumerated powers to the fed-
eral government; the residual lies with the states.40  Although ordinarily 
discussed in terms of legislative power, federalism applies to the judicial 
power as well.  State courts have general jurisdiction to hear all claims.41  
 
Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 569 (2007)).  History supports 
other potential exceptions to Article III; for example, non-judicial bankruptcy tribunals historically 
could conduct “extrajudicial” proceedings to adjudicate claims against a bankruptcy estate.  See 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *477.  Likewise, historically, justices of the peace could 
hear civil claims that did not exceed 40 shillings, Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 16–17 
(1899), and minor criminal cases, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
24 (2d ed. 1979).  That practice may justify an exception to Article III.  See Stettinius v. United 
States, 22 F. Cas. 1322, 1329 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 13,387) (assuming constitutionality of adjudica-
tion by federal justices of the peace). 
 36. See, e.g., Am. Ins. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (justifying territo-
rial exception on the ground that territorial courts exercise judicial power conferred by Congress 
under its Article IV power to regulate the territories). 
 37. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (stating that, oth-
erwise, “Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers” 
might be unduly constricted). 
 38. See Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. Ct. at 1941–45 (noting that separation of powers consid-
erations exist with respect to Article I adjudications).  
 39. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (“[F]ederalism requires that Congress treat the 
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the 
governance of the [United States].”). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 807, 818–19 (2004) (defining general jurisdiction as the “jurisdiction over all claims 
against the defendant based solely on the nature of the contacts between the defendant and the fo-
rum”).  
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Federal judicial power is more limited.42 
Federalism bears on Article I adjudication in two ways.  First, Article I 
adjudication impairs state judicial power.  The Constitution creates a scheme 
under which state courts have the default power to adjudicate all claims, in-
cluding claims arising under federal law.43  States lose that exclusive prerog-
ative only to the extent that Congress creates Article III courts to hear those 
claims.44  Article I adjudication short circuits this arrangement.45  Those tri-
bunals provide an alternative means for federal adjudication.46 
Second, Article I adjudication threatens the states’ interests in their deal-
ing with the federal government.  One reason for the salary and tenure guar-
antees afforded to Article III judges is to reduce their dependence on federal 
officials who may have interests that diverge from those of the states.47  Be-
cause Article I judges do not have those guarantees, they are more likely to 
favor federal interests at the expense of the states.48 
A. Impairing State Court Power 
Each state has its own judicial system that exercises state judicial power.  
This state judicial power extends to all types of disputes, including disputes 
arising under federal law, except to the extent that Congress creates Article 
III courts capable of hearing those claims.49  These federal courts dilute the 
power of state courts because of their power to resolve disputes that would 
 
 42. Introduction to the Federal Court System, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ 
usao/justice-101/federal-courts (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (“Federal courts are courts of limited ju-
risdiction, meaning they can only hear cases authorized by the United States Constitution or federal 
statutes.”).  
 43. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 744.  
 44. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 42.  
 45. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 745 (“[A]judication in Article I tribunals . . . undermines the 
compromise of Article III because those tribunals constitute a second category of federal tribunals 
that may displace the state courts.”).  
 46. Id. 
 47. See Edward Lazarus, Life Tenure for Federal Judges: Should it be Abolished?, CNN (Dec. 
20, 2004, 4:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/12/10/lazarus.federal.judges/ (explaining how 
life tenure “shields [federal] judges from the political pressure that comes with periodic accountabil-
ity to an electorate.”).  
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1), (e) (2012) (stating that US circuit courts appoint Article I bankruptcy 
judges, who serve fourteen-year terms, and may be removed for cause); see Lazarus, supra note 47.  
 49. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962) (noting state courts have gen-
eral jurisdiction, including concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts with respect to federal laws).  
[Vol. 46: 725, 2019] Non-Article III Adjudication 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
734 
otherwise be resolved by state courts.50  But various constraints on Article 
III judges, such as their cost, limit their displacement of state courts.51  Arti-
cle I adjudication undermines this scheme.52 
1. Assumptions Underlying Article III 
Article III rests on the premise that state courts would adjudicate most 
claims.  The federal judicial power conferred by Article III extends to only 
nine types of disputes.53  The assumption, which Madison explicitly articu-
lated during the debates on Article III, was that state courts would resolve 
disputes falling outside these categories.54  But the Constitution does not 
prohibit state courts from hearing suits falling outside these nine categories.  
To the contrary, as Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist 82, Article III 
rests on the assumption that states presumptively have the power to resolve 
claims arising under federal law.55 
Although the Framers agreed that a federal supreme court was necessary 
to ensure the uniform interpretation of federal law and to protect federal in-
terests,56 inferior federal courts were more controversial.57  Those opposed to 
 
 50. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions 
of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2003) (“A federal court is frequently called upon to 
determine matters of state law.”). 
 51. Judicial Compensation, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
compensation (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (noting salaries for federal judges and justices); Survey of 
Judicial Salaries, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 2–3 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ncsc.org/FlashMicrosites 
/JudicialSalaryReview/2015/resources/CurrentJudicialSalaries.pdf (listing salaries for state court 
judges and justices).  
 52. Hessick, supra note 31, at 746 (“[L]itigating in Article I tribunals is perceived as less expen-
sive than litigating in state or federal courts because Article I tribunals need not adhere to the proce-
dures, such as discovery rules, followed in those courts.” (footnote omitted)).  
 53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (identifying the nine types of disputes subject to federal judi-
cial power).  
 54. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the 
Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 819 (1984) (recounting Madison’s 
response to objections about broad federal judicial power that “the far greater number of causes—
ninety-nine out of a hundred—will remain with the state judiciaries”). 
 55. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The 
judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cas-
es lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of 
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe.”). 
 56. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (5th ed. 2003). 
 57. See id. at 8. 
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inferior courts argued, among other things, that federal courts would reduce 
the power of the state courts.58  They would do so not only by hearing cases 
that otherwise would go to state courts, but also by deciding those cases dif-
ferently.59  Because federal judges are federal employees, they might be in-
clined to interpret federal law more broadly, and to interpret state law more 
narrowly (or at least differently), than state judges.60 
Article III aims to accommodate these objections.  Although Article III 
vests the federal judicial power in the federal courts, it does not establish 
federal trial courts to exercise this federal judicial power.61  Instead, Article 
III leaves to Congress the decision whether to establish federal trial courts.62  
To the extent Congress chooses not to create inferior federal courts, state 
courts are the default forums to resolve federal claims.63 
This compromise, together with the statements in the debates surround-
ing the judiciary, reveals two important things.  First, the Framers under-
stood that state courts would adjudicate federal claims in the absence of an 
Article III court.64  Second, the Framers assumed that Article III courts were 
the only federal tribunals that could exercise the federal judicial power.65  
Nowhere do the debates raise the possibility that other parts of the Constitu-
tion authorized Congress to create an Article I tribunal that also would com-
 
 58. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 125 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(noting Roger Sherman’s argument that inferior federal courts would create an unnecessary ex-
pense); id. at 124 (statement of John Rutledge) (“[T]he State Tribunals might and ought to be left in 
all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being suf-
ficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts: that it was making an unnecessary en-
croachment on the jurisdiction [of the States,] and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of 
the new system.” (alteration in original)). 
 59. See FALLON, supra note 56, at 8.  
 60. See Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 238 
(2005–2006) (discussing the uncertainty of federal courts interpreting state law).  
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (refraining from explicitly establishing federal trial courts). 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating Congress may “ordain and establish” courts inferior to 
the Supreme Court).  The only exceptions are cases affecting foreign officials and those in which a 
state is a party; for those disputes, Article III provides that the Supreme Court may sit as a trial court.  
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”). 
 63. See Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State 
Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311 n.3 (1976) (“[T]he framers assumed that if Congress chose not to 
create lower federal courts, the state courts could serve as trial forums in federal cases.”).  
 64. Redish & Muench, supra note 63, at 311 n.3.  
 65. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 668 (“Under the literal interpretation of Article III, Congress 
can create inferior tribunals only in accordance with the requirements of Article III.”).  
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pete with state courts. 
Early practice also supports the central role of the state courts as adjudi-
cators under the federal system.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted to feder-
al courts only a small portion of the allowable jurisdiction under Article 
III.66  It did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on the federal 
courts, and it limited diversity jurisdiction to disputes exceeding $500.67  
Those suits were left to the state courts.68  Moreover, even where the Act did 
confer federal jurisdiction, it generally recognized concurrent state court ju-
risdiction.69  For example, although the Act gave federal courts jurisdiction 
over civil actions for more than $500 based on diversity jurisdiction and civ-
il actions by aliens for violations of treaties, it gave state courts concurrent 
jurisdiction.70  More remarkable, the Act gave concurrent jurisdiction to state 
and federal courts over civil suits by the United States involving at least 
$100.71  The only cases for which the Act gave exclusive jurisdiction to the 
federal courts were those involving federal crimes, admiralty, and seizures 
of property by the United States.72  And even that exclusive jurisdiction soon 
saw inroads.  By the early 1800s, Congress had recognized concurrent state 
jurisdiction over a variety of federal crimes.73 
In short, the text and history of Article III indicate that, to the extent Ar-
ticle III courts did not hear a claim, state courts would have the power to ad-
judicate those cases, and Congress regularly relied on the state courts to ful-
 
 66. 4 The Documentary History Of The Supreme Court Of The United States, 1789-1800: Or-
ganizing The Federal Judiciary: Legislation And Commentaries 59 (Maeva Marcus, et al eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter History of the Supreme Court]. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 280 (1869) (“This idea of calling to the aid of the 
Federal judiciary the State tribunals, by leaving to them concurrent jurisdiction in which Federal 
questions might be involved, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, will be found to be ex-
tensively acted upon in the distribution of the judicial powers of the United States in the act of 1789, 
known as the Judiciary Act.”). 
 69.  See HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 59 (“[T]he circuit Courts shall have 
original cognizance, concurrent with the Courts of the several States . . . .”).  
 70. Id.  
 71. The Judiciary Act, Sec. 9, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789).  
 72. Id.  
 73. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1762–
63 (2013) (discussing the use of state power as the mechanism for federal eminent domain in the 
first two decades of the federal government); Albert Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes, 16 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316, 319–24, 329–30 (1925) (discussing generally the development of 
concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offenses).  
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fill that role.74  That structure alone indicates that non-Article III tribunals 
should not be permitted to exercise judicial power.75  The only types of fed-
eral tribunals that can displace the state courts are Article III courts.76 
2. Constraints on Article III 
Given that state courts are the default forums for adjudication, con-
straints on the Article III judiciary increase the role of state courts.  Article 
III imposes two types of limits on the federal judiciary.77  First, it creates 
impediments to the establishment of Article III courts and to appointing 
judges to those courts.78  Second, it limits the jurisdiction of the Article III 
courts.79  Neither constraint applies to Article I tribunals. 
a. Structural Impediments 
The Constitution imposes various obstacles to the creation of Article III 
courts and appointment of Article III judges.  As noted, Article III does not 
create an inferior federal judiciary.  Instead, it requires Congress to take af-
firmative steps to establish them.80  Inertia, political resistance, economics, 
and the press of other matters all stand in the way to the creation of lower 
federal courts, tilting the odds in favor of maintaining a significant role for 
state courts.81  Congress will create a lower federal court only if it deems 
that it is worth expending the resources to establish a federal system devoted 
to adjudication. 
Those considerations apply differently to Article I tribunals.  Unlike Ar-
ticle III courts, Article I tribunals need not be devoted solely to exercising 
 
 74. See Redish, supra note 63, at 311 n.3.  
 75. Jaime Dodge, Reconceptualizing Non-Article III Tribunals, 99 MINN. L. REV. 905, 905 
(2015) (“Article III is so fundamental to our system of government that no body—not Congress or 
the Executive, nor even the judiciary itself—has the constitutional authority to consent to the remov-
al of the judicial power to another branch.”).  
 76. Id. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. III.  
 78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 81. See ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43746, 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 9–11 (2014) (stating 
that Article III strictly limits Congress’s ability to create lower federal courts).  
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the judicial power.82  Congress can also authorize them to promulgate rules, 
conduct investigations, and perform other tasks.83  These synergies incentiv-
ize Congress to create Article I tribunals, rather than Article III tribunals.84 
Filling Article III judgeships is also difficult.85  The Constitution re-
quires that each be appointed by the president and approved by the Senate.  
This two-branch procedure constrains the creation of Article III judges.86  
Moreover, Article III judges are expensive because of the tenure and salary 
guarantees.87 
The same costs do not apply to non-Article III judges.  The Constitution 
does not provide salary and tenure guarantees for Article I judges.  Although 
some statutes provide substantial salaries for non-Article III judges, Con-
gress may modify those laws if it determines that those judges are no longer 
worth the cost.88  Nor do the same political constraints apply to Article I 
judges.  The Constitution requires only that superior officers receive Senate 
confirmation.89  Congress can create non-Article III judges who are not su-
perior officers.90  Indeed, most non-Article III judges do not require presi-
 
 82. Id. at 13 (noting that unlike Article III courts which have a generalist nature, Article I tribu-
nals can focus on a particular legal field with an adjudicator who is specialized in that area).  Early 
practice established that federal courts cannot act “extrajudicially.”  Letter from John Jay, Chief Jus-
tice, Supreme Court, to George Washington, President, U.S. (Aug. 8, 1793), reprinted in 3 THE 
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 488–89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 
1890). 
 83. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts un-
der Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 238 (1990) (discussing one of the first Article I tribunals that was 
“engaged in policy-making, rule-formulation and enforcement tasks as well as adjudication”).  
 84. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (stating that non-Article III tribunals may “fur-
nish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of 
fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency spe-
cially assigned to that task”).  
 85. See generally Denis Steven Rutkus, Cong. Research Serv., R43762, The Appointment Pro-
cess for U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations: An Overview 1 (2016) (discussing the ap-
pointment process for federal judges and how it has become increasingly scrutinized in recent years).  
 86. Id.  
 87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  The salary for a federal district judge in 2018 is $208,000.  See 
U.S. CTS., supra note 51.  That salary increases about 1% every year.  See id.  Without accounting 
for raises, a fifty-year-old judge appointed today can expect to draw at least a $208,000 salary for at 
least fifteen years given that a fifty-year-old American male has a life expectancy of 79.8.  
ELIZABETH ARIAS, MELONIE HERON & JIAQUAN XU, UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES, 2014, 66 NAT’L 
VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 1, 3 tbl.A (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr66/nvsr66_04 
.pdf. 
 88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating the Appointments Clause requirements).  
 90. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 
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dential appointment and Senate confirmation.  Some are appointed by the 
President, cabinet members, or the courts, and many others are simply em-
ployees who are hired based on a civil service examination.  To be sure, 
some Article I tribunals do require presidential appointment and Senate con-
firmation.  But Congress could reassign the adjudication to those who are 
not superior officers. 
States have another interest in requiring Senate confirmation beyond 
simply slowing the appointments process.  Senate confirmation increases 
state participation in Article III selection.91  Senators are elected by the 
states.92  Because they are elected, those senators have an interest in protect-
ing their respective state’s interests.93  The Senate confirmation requirement 
thus gives states a larger say in Article III judicial appointments.94 
b. Jurisdictional Limits 
Article III courts cannot adjudicate all disputes.  Article III extends the 
federal judicial power to nine categories of “cases” and “controversies.”95  
Various justiciability doctrines implement this case-or-controversy limita-
tion.96  These include the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.97  
Article III courts cannot hear a dispute that violates any of these require-
ments.98 
 
HARV. L. REV. 915, 921–22 (1988) (discussing how Congress, under Article I, created “legislative 
courts” to which Article III guarantees do not apply). 
 91. See RUTKUS, supra note 85 (explaining that through the Senate, states play a large role in the 
judicial confirmation process and that “[a] consideration for Senators will be the views of their con-
stituents, especially if many voters back home are thought to feel strongly about a nomination”).  
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena-
tors from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .”).  
 93. See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, Joe Manchin’s Yes on Kavanaugh Finds Sympathy in West Vir-
ginia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/politics/joe-manchin-
brett-kavanaugh-west-virginia.html (discussing how a democratic Senator voted to confirm a con-
servative Supreme Court Justice because, otherwise, his constituents would not reelect him).   
 94. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547 (1954). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 96. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (discussing the various justiciability 
doctrines that limit the case-or-controversy requirement, including standing, ripeness, mootness and 
political questions).  
 97. Id.; F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 62 
(2015). 
 98. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (“The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on feder-
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These federal justiciability doctrines do not apply to state courts.99  State 
law defines the power of state courts, and the scope of that power varies 
from state to state.100  Although some states have adopted rules similar to the 
federal justiciability requirements, others have conferred greater power on 
their courts.101  State courts accordingly can adjudicate disputes that the Ar-
ticle III courts cannot. 
Although Article III courts cannot adjudicate these non-justiciable dis-
putes, non-Article III tribunals can.102  The case and controversy restriction 
does not apply to non-Article III tribunals.103  They accordingly have the po-
tential to hear claims that otherwise would be left to the state courts because 
they cannot be heard in the Article III courts.104 
B. Protecting State Interests 
Aside from making Article III courts costly, the independence guaran-
tees of Article III play an important role in protecting state interests.105  State 
and federal interests often diverge.106  State and federal officials may desire 
different policies and may have different views of appropriate allocations of 
power between the state and federal governments.107 
Fears about these divergent interests led to the establishment of a federal 
judiciary.108  The Framers were afraid that state courts, staffed with judges 
 
al judicial power in our system of government.”).  
 99. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article III do not 
apply to state courts . . . .”). 
 100.  Hessick, supra note 97, at 65–75, 94 (discussing variations in state justiciability doctrines). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 194 F.3d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“Agencies, of course, are not constrained by Article III of the Constitution; nor are they governed 
by judicially-created standing doctrines restricting access to the federal courts.”).  
 103. See id. 
 104. See id.  
 105. See NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 81, at 10 (“Article III courts, which are insulated from 
political pressures through salary and tenure protections, provide a legal forum to help ensure com-
pliance with federal interests, including those enshrined in the Constitution.”).  
 106. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the 
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 521 (2011) (discussing how state interests differ from federal inter-
ests in the context of criminal prosecution). 
 107. See id.; see also Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1805, 1805 (2018) (explaining the states’ strong interest in connection with recent federal pro-
cedure changes).  
 108. NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 81, at 10 (“[W]ithout an independent federal judiciary, 
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answerable to the people and politicians of the state, would discriminate 
against federal interests.109  The same argument applies to federal judges.  
Federal judges may favor federal interests at the expense of the states. 
Article III partially ameliorates this problem by guaranteeing the salary 
and tenure of Article III judges.110  These guarantees aim to protect Article 
III judges from the influence of other federal officials, who may try to influ-
ence the courts to promote their interests.111  Article I judges do not enjoy 
the same protections.112  Accordingly, they are more susceptible to pressures 
from the President, Congress, and any other federal officials who exercise 
some control over the judges’ salary and tenure.113  Article I judges therefore 
pose a larger threat to state interests than Article III judges do.114 
That threat to state interests is obvious in disputes in which the state or 
one of its officers is a party.115  The Article I tribunal may rule against the 
state based on a shaky interpretation of the law simply out of a desire to 
please federal officials.116  But those types of disputes are rare.117  More 
 
original litigation on federal claims would arise in state courts.  The Framers, who had just witnessed 
the resulting chaos of decentralization during the Articles of Confederation, considered that having 
such power in the exclusive province of state courts ‘presented a real threat to the enforcement of 
federal law against the states,’ and consequently, the first Congress . . . established the system of 
lower federal courts.” (footnote omitted)).  
 109. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 111. Pfander, supra note 2, at 646 & n.4 (discussing the importance of life tenure and salary guar-
antees for Article III judges in ensuring the separation of powers and judicial independence).  
 112. Id. (stating that despite these important Article III provisions, “Congress has often assigned 
disputes that appear to fall within the scope of the federal judicial power to Article I tribunals whose 
judges lack salary and tenure protections”). 
 113. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Ap-
proach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 418–419 (1996) (explaining the importance of separation of pow-
ers).  
 114. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Supreme Court concluded that 
nothing in the historical record suggests that the founders viewed the independence of the Article III 
courts as essential to protecting state interests in federal adjudication.  478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986).  
While that may or may not be correct, it does not address the commonsense notion that independent 
federal judges are more likely to fairly adjudicate claims implicating state interests than judges who 
are incentivized to discriminate in favor of federal interests.  See supra notes 110–11. 
 115. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 718 (discussing the importance of an impartial adjudicator in 
protecting the parties’ respective interests).  
 116 See id. (explaining how Article I tribunals could threaten the societal interest of “living under 
a government that adjudicates based on the rule of law instead of political considerations”). 
 117 See Anita R. Brown-Graham, When You Can’t Sue the State: State Sovereign Immunity, 
POPULAR GOVERNMENT, Summer 2000, at 3, https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files 
/articles/article1_25.pdf (discussing the constitutional limitations on “both the federal government’s 
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common suits involving state interests are those presenting questions of state 
law.118  State laws embody decisions by the state regarding how to regulate 
themselves, and federal adjudications of those laws results in a non-state 
body determining their meaning.119  States have an interest in having their 
laws interpreted by an independent Article III court instead of an Article I 
tribunal dependent on federal politicians.120  The former is more likely than 
the latter to interpret the law objectively according to its terms.121 
State interests are not limited to disputes directly involving states or 
their laws; they extend to many disputes that turn solely on federal law.122  
Because federal law preempts state law, any determination about the mean-
ing of federal law affects to some degree the potential reach of state law.123  
A ruling that federal law controls a particular area prohibits state regulation 
of that same area.124  Likewise, a determination by an Article I tribunal that 
federal law authorizes an agency to regulate in a particular area poses the po-
tential for federal regulation to displace state law.125  To be sure, some dis-
 
ability to provide remedies for wrongs committed by state governments and individual citizens’ abil-
ity to use the courts to enforce remedies against state governments for violations of federally guaran-
teed statutory rights.”). 
 118. See id. 
 119. Mark R. Kramer, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment at 
Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 229 (1984) (The Erie Doctrine “requires that 
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law, decisional as well as statu-
tory and constitutional”).  
 120. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1052 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t would not be inconsistent for a state to want the laws . . . to be interpreted by judg-
es who are dependent on the electoral branches of its own government, while not wanting the laws to 
be interpreted by judges dependent on the electoral branches of another sovereign.”). 
 121. See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 308 (1989). 
 122. See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT 339, 
341–42 (2010) (addressing state interests in the context of the federal law preemption controversy).  
 123. BRUTUS XI (New York Journal, Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 515 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1984) (“Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon 
the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction.  In 
proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be restricted.”). 
 124. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1141 (2007) (explaining that 
when Congress enacts a pervasive federal regulation in a particular field, its inferred that the states 
may not supplement it).  
 125. See id.  Exacerbating the non-Article III intrusion on state sovereignty is that those tribunals 
have not recognized many of the doctrines that protect state interests in Article III courts.  See Ellen 
E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1082–
83 & n.230–31 (1999).  For example, Article III courts have developed a variety of abstention doc-
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putes pose greater threats to the states than others.126  Disputes that call for 
routine application of law to fact pose little risk to the states.127  But even 
those disputes may produce decisions that expand the federal government’s 
power at the expense of the states.128 
IV. APPLYING FEDERALISM CONSIDERATIONS TO EXISTING DOCTRINE 
Shifting the approach for assessing the lawfulness of Article I adjudica-
tion from one focusing exclusively on separation of powers to one including 
federalism helps explain some exceptions that courts have recognized to Ar-
ticle III.  It also suggests ways that the current exceptions to Article III 
should be modified. 
A. Territorial Courts 
The territorial exception permits Congress to create courts to adjudicate 
disputes in the territorial holdings of the United States.129  The traditional 
justification for the exception is that Article IV grants Congress plenary 
power over the territories, and through this power, Congress can assign non-
Article III judicial power to territorial courts.130  This justification is un-
sound.  Article III “vest[s]” the federal “judicial power” in the Article III 
 
trines under which a federal court will not hear a case that raises issues that are better suited for state 
courts or that have already been raised in a pending state criminal case.  Id. at 1083 n.231.  Some 
agencies have not yet adopted these doctrines.  See, e.g., W. Suburban Recycling & Energy Ctr., 
L.P., 6 E.A.D. 692, 712 (EAB Dec. 11, 1996) (declining to resolve whether EPA follows abstention 
doctrines).  And some have exhibited hostility to them on the ground that that abstention is inappro-
priate because agencies have the “expertise” to administer statutes entrusted to them.  See Mo. Inter-
state Gas, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61074, ¶ 61462 (Apr. 20, 2007). 
 126. See Fallon, supra note 90, at 935–37 (explaining the values of non-Article III courts, includ-
ing the delegation of disputes involving the delegation of disputes involving the application of law to 
fact).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 978 (explaining that Article I administrate agencies “may also have a bureaucratic ten-
dency to expand their own power”). 
 129. See Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United States 
Territories: The Case of American Samoa, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 379, 379–81 (1991) (describing the 
formation of territorial courts in the United States).   
 130. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838).  The Court has 
relied on similar reasoning to justify Article I courts in the District of Columbia, U.S. holdings in 
foreign countries, and Indian reservations.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 65 n.16 (1982), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (2012), as recognized in 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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courts,131 and the judicial power conferred by Article IV is a type of federal 
judicial power.132 
Federalism provides a better explanation.133  In the nineteenth century 
when the territorial exception was first recognized, state courts did not pre-
sumptively have the power to resolve a suit that arose in the territories.134  
Restrictions on personal and territorial jurisdiction limited the states to adju-
dicating people or property found within their borders.135  Territorial dis-
putes were beyond the jurisdiction of the state courts.136  States therefore did 
not have an interest in protecting their role in adjudicating disputes in the 
territories.137  Nor did territorial courts present a real threat to the states.  
Territorial courts did not apply state or general federal law; instead, they ap-
plied local law that applied just to the territories.138  Territorial courts thus 
did not usurp the power of state courts or otherwise imperil state interests.139 
This federalism explanation finds support in American Insurance Co. v. 
 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 132. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal 
Courts, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 719 (1982) (calling the discussion in Canter “poorly 
explained” and “difficult to reconcile with the purposes of [A]rticle III”). 
 133. Federalism does not provide the only alternative explanation as Article III was designed to 
protect citizens living in the states, and individuals living in the territories did not qualify as full citi-
zens warranting that protection, see Pfander, supra note 2, at 707—though this argument does not 
explain why territorial courts should be permitted to adjudicate suits over citizens of the state travel-
ing in a territory.  See id.  
 134. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (explaining the limits on state jurisdiction).  If 
territorial courts had jurisdiction to hear claims arising in the states, Congress could circumvent Ar-
ticle III and state courts by directing that all claims subject to federal adjudication proceed to a non-
Article III territorial court—for example, it could direct that all federal causes of action be tried in 
D.C. Superior Court.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 982 
(2015) (stating that the D.C. Superior Court is “a non-Article III federal territorial court” that is re-
quired to implement federal law and protect defendants’ constitutional rights).  
 135. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. 
 136. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 707, 709–11 (stating that territorial citizens lacked access to 
state and federal courts outside of their respective territories). 
 137. PETER S. DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (Philadelphia, Abraham Small 1824) (stat-
ing that the limitations in Article III “were expressly introduced for the purpose of guarding and pro-
tecting so much of the sovereignty of the States . . . ; but where the Constitution gives to the federal 
government an exclusive power over certain districts and territories, it could not mean to restrict 
their judiciary, where there was no sovereignty to protect but their own”). 
 138. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 709 (“[R]ights of territorial citizens were defined by reference 
to a unique set of local laws . . . .”). 
 139. Id.  
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356 Bales of Cotton, which first recognized the territorial exception.140  In 
upholding the adjudication, the Court stated that if the suit had arisen in one 
of the states instead of in a territory outside the states, only an Article III 
court could adjudicate the claim.141  But this limitation did not apply to the 
territories because in the territories Congress exercises the “powers . . . of a 
state government.”142 
Changes in the law since the nineteenth century, however, suggest that 
the territorial exception is now too broad.  The power of the state courts has 
expanded.  State courts now can hear disputes arising outside the state so 
long as the parties have sufficient contacts with the state.143  States accord-
ingly can adjudicate many disputes in the territories.144  This expansion of 
state jurisdiction suggests that the territorial exception should be narrowed.  
If any state court has the power to hear a claim because of the parties’ con-
tacts with a state, that state court should be the alternative forum to an Arti-
cle III court.  Permitting a territorial tribunal to hear those claims infringes 
on the states’ prerogative to adjudicate claims not subject to Article III juris-
diction.145 
 
 140. Am. Ins. v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (holding “that the Act of 
the territorial legislature[] erecting the Court . . . is not ‘inconsistent with the laws and Constitution 
of the United States,’ and is valid”). 
 141. Id. at 546 (“Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states in those Courts, 
only, which are established in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution; the same limitation 
does not extend to the territories.  In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers 
of the general, and of a state government.”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 144. Id.; see, e.g., John J. Harte, Validity of a State Court’s Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction 
Over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country: Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State 
Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63, 65 (1997) (explaining that state courts may exercise jurisdiction 
over disputes arising in Indian territory). 
 145. Limiting the territorial exception in this way would potentially have the largest impact on 
disputes arising on Indian reservations located within a state.  See, e.g., Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 
415, 423 (1907) (recognizing that Congress had the authority to establish courts responsible for is-
sues regarding Indian territory property claims in relation to tribal membership discrepancies).  
Those reservations exist in state boundaries, and the Constitution permits state courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over claims arising on those reservations.  See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. 
Burr, 522 N.Y.S.2d 742, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (recognizing broad state jurisdiction for claims 
arising on reservation); see also In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that ICWA 
“discloses that Congress recognized that there can be concurrent jurisdiction in state and tribal 
courts”).  Accordingly, states have the prerogative to adjudicate those claims except to the extent 
Congress assigns those claims to an Article III court.  See Harte, supra note 144, at 65 and accompa-
nying text. 
[Vol. 46: 725, 2019] Non-Article III Adjudication 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
746 
B. Military Exception 
The military exception consists of two strands: courts-martial and mili-
tary commissions.  A federalism view of Article III does not provide much 
insight about the courts-martial exception.146  That is because the states’ in-
terests in constraining the exercise of federal judicial power applies only 
when a federal body seeks to exercise judicial power,147 and courts-martial 
do not exercise judicial power.  Instead, they exercise executive power.148  
Their function is not to enforce rights through judgments, but to maintain 
discipline in the ranks.149 
Military commissions raise larger federalism interests.  Unlike courts-
martial, commissions do exercise judicial power.150  Their function is to en-
ter judgments against individuals who are not members of the U.S. mili-
tary.151  Traditionally, these commissions heard charges against enemy com-
batants in foreign territory.152  Those types of cases do not raise significant 
federalism interests because state jurisdiction does not extend to them, and 
they adjudicate non-state offenses.153 
But efforts to expand the commissions into the states do raise federalism 
concerns.  State courts would ordinarily have the power to hear those cas-
 
 146. Of course, many military disputes likely fall outside the personal jurisdiction of any state.  
See David Vine, The United States Probably Has More Foreign Military Bases Than Any Other 
People, Nation, or Empire in History, THE NATION (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/ 
article/the-united-states-probably-has-more-foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-or-
empire-in-history/ (discussing the United States’ vast international military presence).  
 147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending federal judicial power to nine types of disputes).  
Other federalism arguments apply when the federal government seeks to exercise power other than 
judicial power, but those arguments are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 148. See Jonathan Hafetz, Policing the Line: International Law, Article III, and the Constitutional 
Limits of Military Jurisdiction, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 681, 687; Fred L. Borch, Defending Soldiers at 
Early Courts-Martial, 2017 ARMY LAW, no. 5, at 1 (“[C]ourts-martial were courts of discipline, and 
not justice.”). 
 149. See Borch, supra note 148, at 1.  The argument is not without faults, however, because 
courts-martial maintain discipline by adjudicating charges against service members and entering 
judgments imposing punishment on findings of guilt.  See Hafetz, supra note 148, at 689 (noting that 
lay juries do not participate in courts-martial).   
 150. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 757 (discussing military commissions exercising judicial pow-
er).  
 151. Id. (explaining that the role of military commissions is to try cases “of illegal enemy combat-
ants”).  
 152. Id.  
 153. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (explaining the limitations of state court juris-
dictions).  
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es.154  While Congress could confer exclusive federal jurisdiction on federal 
courts, it should have to bear the cost of assigning those claims to Article III 
courts if it wishes to do so.  That cost protects the states’ interests in adjudi-
cating the claims.155 
C. The Public Rights Exception 
Under the public rights exception, Article I tribunals can adjudicate 
three types of disputes: (1) efforts by the government to vindicate its rights; 
(2) suits by individuals to enforce their rights against the government; and 
(3) suits between individuals turning on federal rights that are part of a 
broader administrative scheme.  A federalism view of the judicial power 
provides insights into each of these strands. 
1. Government Efforts to Vindicate Public Rights 
The oldest strand of the public rights exception involves government ef-
forts to vindicate its public rights.156  Public rights are rights held by the 
government, such as the right to collect taxes.157  They are the government 
counterpart to private rights, which are the traditional rights held by individ-
uals. 
In its earliest form, this strand of the exception recognized that, just as 
the law can authorize individuals to enforce their rights extra-judicially—
i.e., without the aid of the judicial power—so too the law can authorize the 
 
 154. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  
 155. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866) (holding that military commissions 
could not hear claims against citizens who had been members of the confederacy).  To be sure, Mil-
ligan focused on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury instead of on the limits of Article III.  Id. at 
123–24.  But the Court has made clear that the test for whether the Seventh Amendment applies 
tracks the test for whether a claim may be assigned to a non-Article III tribunal, and prohibiting the 
commission from exercising jurisdiction also protected the states’ interest in trying those claims.  
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) (“[T]he question [for] whether the Seventh 
Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as 
factfinders requires the same answer as the question [for] whether Article III allows Congress to as-
sign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal.”). 
 156. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1964–67 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the historical development of the federal government’s enforcement of public 
rights).  
 157. See id. at 1965; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 279–80 (2008) (discussing federal public rights).  
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government to enforce its public rights extra-judicially.158  Murray’s Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. provides an illustration.159  There, a 
federal customs officer failed to give the United States duties that he collect-
ed for the United States.160  After calculating the shortfall, the United States 
seized some of the official’s property to satisfy the debt.161  A subsequent 
suit challenged the seizure on the ground that only an Article III court could 
perform the calculation and seizure.162 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  The Court explained that the federal 
government had a right to be paid by the official, and although Congress 
could have required the government to go to an Article III court, it chose not 
to impose that requirement.163  Instead, federal law authorized the govern-
ment to seize property outside of court to offset the debt.164  In other words, 
federal law established a standard extra-judicial remedy: just like the law has 
long authorized a private person to reclaim stolen property outside of court 
or to seize assets to compensate for unpaid rent,165 the government could 
claim property to offset a debt owed by a collections officer.166  Murray thus 
establishes that Congress may generally authorize extra-judicial means to 
enforce public rights.167 
One way of extra-judicially enforcing public rights is to assign them to 
 
 158. Wellness Int’l Network, 135 S. Ct. at 1965 (noting that because “public rights were not 
thought to fall within the core of the judicial power, then that could explain why Congress would be 
able to perform or authorize non-Article III adjudications of public rights without transgressing Arti-
cle III[]” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 159. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 272 (1855).  
 160. Id. at 275. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 275, 282. 
 163. Id. at 283–84. 
 164. Id. at 285.  
 165. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3–10 (detailing the types of redress for pri-
vate injuries that may be “obtained by the mere act of the parties” outside of courts). 
 166. See Murray, 59 U.S. at 284.  In stating that the government can choose to vindicate its public 
rights through government officials outside the judiciary, Murray stressed that Congress could not 
do the same for private rights.  Id.  As the Court put it, Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial 
cognizance” suits “at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . .”  Id.  Further, although the 
government can authorize a non-judicial government body to vindicate its public rights, it cannot 
authorize that body to vindicate private rights.  Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 
1932, 1965 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  If a person chooses to invoke the government’s aid to enforce a 
private right, he must proceed through the judiciary.  See id. 
 167. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450–51 
460 (1977). 
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Article I tribunals.  The provision of these non-judicial remedies by Article I 
tribunals does not implicate the states’ interest in limiting the federal judicial 
power because those remedies do not involve the judicial power.168 
But things are different when an Article I tribunal seeks to vindicate 
public rights in a way that does involve judicial power—for example, when 
an Article I tribunal seeks to enter a “dispositive judgment,” a hallmark of 
judicial power.169  Only state courts and Article III courts can exercise judi-
cial power.  To be sure, the United States may have an interest in vindicating 
its rights in federal instead of state court.170  But this suggests that Congress 
should confer Article III jurisdiction over those suits, not that the Constitu-
tion prohibits state jurisdiction over those suits. 
2. Suits Against the Government 
The second strand of the public rights exception covers suits by individ-
uals against the government.171  These suits do not seek to enforce public 
rights held by the government; instead, they seek to vindicate private rights 
against the government.172 
The Court based this exception on sovereign immunity.173  Sovereign 
immunity bars suit against the government unless it consents.174  According 
 
 168. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (stating that 
“it was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its con-
trol, to [give] . . . executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of in-
voking the judicial power”).  
 169. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (“[A] judicial Power is one to ren-
der dispositive judgments.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presiden-
tial Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1989–90))); accord SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, 
LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (New York & Albany, Bank & Bros. 
1891).  Although the exact contours of judicial power are not well defined, it includes at the very 
least the power to enter dispositive judgments.  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219. 
 170. See FALLON, supra note 56, at 8. 
 171. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) (“Congress may effectively sup-
plant a common-law cause of action . . . if that statutory cause of action . . . lies against[] the Federal 
Government in its sovereign capacity.”). 
 172. See id. (discussing a private rights suit against the government based on a statutory cause of 
action that does not permit a jury trial). 
 173. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451–52 (1929) (explaining that no court may adjudi-
cate claims against the United States unless Congress explicitly permits it). 
 174. Id.; see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (explain-
ing “sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the Government may attach conditions to its consent 
to be sued”), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (2012), as recognized in Wellness Int’l Net-
work, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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to the Court, the government can attach conditions to that consent.175  Thus, 
the reason that an Article I tribunal can hear suits against the government is 
that the government has consented to suit only before that tribunal. 
This rationale is inconsistent with Article III.  Article III confers the 
federal judicial power on the federal courts.  The government cannot reas-
sign this federal judicial power to Article I tribunals by conditioning its con-
sent to suit.176  Sovereign immunity provides the government with the power 
to restrict the power of courts to exercise their judicial power in suits against 
the government, not to confer the judicial power on non-Article III tribu-
nals.177 
If Article I tribunals hearing claims against the United States do exercise 
the judicial power, those adjudications undermine the federalism structure of 
Article III.178  State courts have the power to adjudicate claims against the 
United States—indeed, they regularly did so in the nineteenth century.179  
Allowing Congress to dictate that it will waive sovereign immunity only in 
Article I tribunals allows it to avoid state courts without bearing the costs of 
establishing Article III courts. 
 
 175. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67; see also Juda v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 667, 687 
(1987) (“The doctrine of public rights is based, in part, on the traditional principle of sovereign im-
munity, which recognizes that the government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued.”). 
 176. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 731 (arguing that consent does not confer jurisdiction). 
 177. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 68.  One could develop a theory for claiming that suits in 
which the United States waives its sovereign immunity do not involve the judicial power; for exam-
ple, one could argue that sovereign immunity waivers are not decisions by Congress to permit suits 
against the United States, but instead, they are decisions to pay individuals through private legisla-
tion.  But see Hessick, supra note 31, at 749 n.206 (“One might argue that . . . the ability of the gov-
ernment to waive sovereign immunity establishes that structural limitations are waivable.”).  Under 
this theory, Article I adjudication is actually a determination of how to disburse funds through that 
legislation.  Cf. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver Of 
Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 189–90 (2002) (explaining how the Spending 
Power in the sovereign immunity context can provide Congress a “‘back door’ through which to 
accomplish policy goals”).  These Article I adjudications thus would not vindicate individual rights 
that have been violated, but would instead create new entitlements for the beneficiaries.  Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (noting that private bills create compensation entitlement).  
But the Court has not adopted this or any other theory that suggests sovereign immunity waiver does 
not involve the judicial power.  See Hessick, supra note 31, at 749 n.206.   
 178. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 746.  
 179. See generally Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 445, 447–48 (1883) (holding that the Rhode 
Island state court’s denial of the defendant’s demurrer based on sovereign immunity was valid).  One 
might argue that state courts simply lack the power to hear claims against the United States, but that 
is not so; during the nineteenth century, state courts regularly heard suits against the United States.  
See id. 
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3. Private Suits 
The third strand of the public rights exception includes suits that are be-
tween private parties that allege federal statutorily created rights that are “so 
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropri-
ate for agency resolution . . . .”180  This “private” strand also does not in-
volve the assertion of a public right belonging to the government.  Nor does 
it require the government to be a party.181  It extends to disputes between 
private parties alleging only individual rights, so long as those rights are re-
lated to a regulatory scheme.182 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the resolution of these pri-
vate suits is an exercise of the judicial power.183  But it has justified the ex-
ercise of that power by an Article I tribunal by claiming that the disruption 
of the separation of powers is minimal because intrusion on the power of the 
Article III judiciary is insignificant.184 
This argument overlooks the threat to federalism presented by Article I 
adjudication of these suits.  Permitting Article I tribunals to resolve these 
disputes interferes with the states’ prerogative to resolve disputes through 
the judicial power unless Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Ar-
ticle III courts. 
To be sure, the suits falling within this strand of the exception necessari-
ly involve federal, and not state, law.185  But states have an interest in deter-
mining the scope of federal law because of federal law’s power to preempt 
state law.186  Accordingly, Article I tribunals should not be permitted to ad-
judicate those claims.187 
 
 180. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (The crucial question, in cases not 
involving the Federal Government, is whether “Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pur-
suant to its constitutional powers under Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so 
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution 
with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co, 473 U.S. 568, 593–94 (1985))). 
 181. See Granfinanciaera, 492 U.S. at 54; Thomas, 473 U.S. at 569 (holding that one’s “right to 
an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of record”).   
 182. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54; see supra note 2 and accompanying text.   
 183. See Thomas, 437 U.S. at 589.  
 184. Id. (stating that in these circumstances, the intrusion on the “judicial powers is reduced”). 
 185. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54 (discussing how this strand of the public rights exception is 
only implicated if Congress creates legislation).  
 186. See Diller, supra note 124, at 1141.  
 187. See id; Garrick B. Pursley, Avoiding Deference Questions, 44 TULSA L. REV. 557, 577 (2009) 
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D. Consent 
Under the consent exception, an Article I tribunal can hear any claim if 
the parties consent to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, so long as the Article III 
courts maintain some supervisory authority over the Article I tribunal.188  
The theory underlying the exception is that the litigants’ consent waives any 
individual right to an Article III adjudication189 and that conditioning non-
Article III adjudication on the litigants’ consent minimizes any separation of 
power concerns because it prevents Congress from unilaterally removing 
cases from the Article III judiciary.190 
This line of argument ignores the states’ potential interests against per-
mitting Article I adjudication based on the parties’ consent.191  First, under 
the consent exception, a “party no longer has the option of filing only in ei-
ther a state court or an Article III court; instead, it can choose to proceed be-
fore an Article I tribunal.”192  Thus, Article I tribunals provide “more options 
for proceeding in federal court and consequently may result in fewer cases 
being filed in state court.”193  States accordingly have less control over the 
development of the law and resolution of disputes.194 
Second, the consent exception permits non-Article III adjudication of 
disputes raising acute state interests.  Under the exception, non-Article III 
judges can adjudicate any type of claim, including claims involving state law 
 
(observing that “preemption, if not properly constrained, threatens to diminish state government au-
thority below the constitutionally-required minimum threshold”).  
 188. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015) (“[A]llowing Article I 
adjudicators to decide claims submitted to them by consent does not offend the separation of powers 
so long as Article III courts retain supervisory authority over the process.”). 
 189. Id. at 1943 (reasoning that the party’s consent to the adjudication weighed heavily on the 
adjudication’s validity). 
 190. See id. at 1944 (stating that because Article III judges appoint and may remove Magistrate 
judges, Congress’s use of a Magistrate judge via Article I tribunals is not a threat to Article III juris-
diction).  
 191. Hessick, supra note 31, at 745 (explaining that “[f]ederal adjudicators may discriminate 
against state interests, especially if the adjudicators are answerable to the public.  For that reason, 
states have an interest in federal judges that are independent of the [P]resident and Congress”).  
 192. Id.  To be sure, the parties “proceed to Article I tribunals only if they choose to do so.”  Id.  
But that is irrelevant because the problem is that the law permits the parties to choose to go to the 
Article I tribunal instead of to an Article III or state court.  Id. at 746 (“Allowing Article I tribunals 
to adjudicate claims thus makes it easier for Congress to encroach on state sovereignty.”).  
 193. Id. at 745. 
 194. Id. at 745–46.  The Court imposed some limit on this exception by stating that Congress does 
not rely on it to create a “a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals.”  Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986). 
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and claims involving the scope of federal law that may preempt state law.195  
These concerns are not alleviated just because the parties may proceed to an 
Article I tribunal only if they decide to do so.196  Unless the state itself is a 
party, the interests of the state are unlikely to guide the parties’ choice of fo-
rum; instead, the parties’ will have their own interests in mind.197  Indeed, 
non-state parties may choose to go to an Article I tribunal precisely because 
they perceive that Article I tribunal will interpret the law in a way that disfa-
vors the states.198 
E. Catch all 
A federalism view of Article III should result in the eradication of the 
catch all exception.199  That exception permits Article I tribunals to exercise 
judicial power to adjudicate claims that otherwise would be brought in a 
state or Article III court.200 
F. Adjunct 
The theory underlying the adjunct exception is that adjuncts do not ex-
ercise judicial power.201  Instead, like law clerks, they merely advise Article 
III courts on how to rule in a particular case.202  That justification is dubious 
 
 195. Hessick, supra note 31, at 745 n.182 (discussing how standing, mootness and ripeness doc-
trines do not apply to state courts or Article I tribunals, thus allowing both adjudication types to hear 
any claim). 
 196. Id. at 745. 
 197. See generally, Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Se-
lecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 79–80 (1999) (discussing a party’s strategy of selecting a forum 
in order to give that party the best chance at achieving its interest and win the suit).  
 198. Id. at 99 (“Litigants not only seek courts that will apply law favorable to their positions, but 
they also seek courts that are most likely to interpret and apply the law in a way that is favorable to 
their positions.”). 
 199. See Pushaw, supra note 113, at 451–52 (discussing the federalist view to judicial review, 
justiciability and separation of powers). 
 200. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (explaining when Congress may create an Article I 
tribunals to adjudicate Article III business).  
 201. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. 
L.J. 291, 302–04 (1990) (discussing various views on the judicial power of an adjunct—i.e. non-
Article III tribunal—versus an Article III court).  
 202. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 58, 60 (1932) (stating that when Congress creates commis-
sions and boards which help govern various transactions, such entities are still subject to the judicial 
power where constitutional rights are challenged); see also Pfander, supra note 2, at 742 (“Congress 
has established a range of adjudicatory agencies, relying upon the model of Crowell and structuring 
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because the determinations of adjuncts often are binding on courts and dic-
tate the outcome in a case.203  But if we accept it as true, a federalism view 
of judicial power does not prohibit adjuncts because they do not exercise ju-
dicial power.204  Federalism does provide an additional reason, however, to 
closely scrutinize expansions of the adjunct exception.  Any expansion 
would interfere not only with the Article III courts, but also with the state 
courts.205 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL ADJUDICATION 
Reducing the scope of non-Article III jurisdiction leaves the question of 
who will decide those cases.206  Non-Article III tribunals hear millions of 
cases each year.207  A federalism view of non-Article III tribunals would not 
prohibit Article I adjudication of all these claims, but it would significantly 
limit non-Article III jurisdiction.208 
One option is to increase the size of the Article III judiciary to handle 
the displaced non-Article III docket.  But the expansion would have to be 
substantial for it to make a real difference in the ability of the courts to hear 
those cases.  Currently, 380,000 new cases are filed each year in Article III 
courts,209 and a significant portion of those cases are resolved by non-Article 
III magistrate judges.210  The number of suits filed in non-Article III tribu-
 
the agencies to perform specialized work as assistants, or adjuncts, to federal courts that bear ulti-
mate responsibility for resolution of the dispute.”). 
 203. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 303 n.61 (doubting any important difference between adjuncts 
and judges). 
 204. See Bator, supra note 83, at 253 (stating Congress may assign adjudication to an adjunct, but 
the adjunct’s functions must be limited insofar as an Article III court still ultimately retains its judi-
cial power over the adjudication). 
 205. See id. at 236–38 (discussing the pervasive expansion of adjunct courts). 
 206. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015) (stating that 
without non-Article III tribunals, “the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt”). 
 207.  See Judicial Business 2017, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-
business-2017 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (stating that in 2017, over 790,000 bankruptcy petitions 
alone were filed, which is more than double the number of petitions filed in Article III courts). 
 208. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 753 (stating that non-Article III tribunals could still play an 
impactful role through hearing nondispositive motions, managing discovery, conducting trials and 
making recommendations to Article III courts). 
 209. See U.S. CTS., supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 210. See U.S. Magistrate Judges – Judicial Business 2017, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
statistics-reports/us-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2017 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (stating that 
district court judges referred 348,629 civil matters to magistrate judges in 2017).  
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nals is far greater.  Over 800,000 new social security claims are filed each 
year211—and that is only in one agency.  The Article III judiciary would like-
ly have to be more than doubled or even tripled to handle the extra cases in 
the non-Article III docket. 
There are at least three downsides to this expansion.  First, Article III 
judgeships are expensive.  Judges have lifetime tenure and guaranteed sala-
ry.  Second, greatly expanding Article III judgeships could generally result 
in worse judges.  That is not simply because many more judges would need 
to be appointed; there is also the risk that qualified individuals would be less 
interested in joining the federal bench if the number of judgeships vastly in-
creased because the increase would dilute the prestige of the job.212  Third, 
because of lifetime tenure, altering the Article III judiciary is a clumsy way 
of handling the non-Article III docket.213  Currently, non-Article III tribunals 
specialize in particular areas of the law.214  This specialization allows those 
tribunals to handle cases more efficiently.  Maintaining that efficiency would 
entail creating specialized Article III courts.215  But that specialization could 
become outdated over time if the rates of particular claims change.  For ex-
ample, many immigration claims may be brought today, but in thirty years, 
there may be many fewer.216  Because Article III’s guarantees do not apply 
to non-Article III judges, Congress can more easily restructure non-Article 
III tribunals than Article III courts to meet these changes.217 
 
 211. Adjudication Research: Joint project of ACUS and Stanford Law School, STAN. U.,  
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/caseload-statistics (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (reporting that 
826,635 social security cases were filed with the Social Security Administration).  
 212. See Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2008) 
(explaining the prestige and benefits of being an Article III judge).  
 213. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 763 (stating that Article III judges with life tenure could not be 
fired even if there are too few cases to support that many judges in the future).  
 214. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 651 n.26 (discussing the need to for Article I tribunals to mini-
mize litigation costs and provide expert adjudicators “to deal with specialized issue of law,” includ-
ing bankruptcy and worker’s compensation). 
 215. See Bator, supra note 83, at 239 (discussing that while specialized Article III courts could 
have been created in theory, “it would have been quite impossible, psychologically and politically, to 
create thousands upon thousands of life-tenured [A]rticle III workmen’s compensation and social 
security and ICC and Security and Exchange Commission and NLRB and Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and OSHA ‘judges’ sitting in [A]rticle III administrative courts”). 
 216. See Immigration Cases Pile up in Courts across the U.S., NPR, https://www.npr.org/2018/ 
06/26/623451409/immigration-cases-pile-up-in-courts-across-the-u-s (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) 
(discussing how the backlog of immigration cases began in the Bush administration and accelerated 
during the Obama administration).  
 217. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 651 n.26. 
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Leaving more cases to the states also poses problems.  States may be 
eager to have their courts decide some cases currently resolved by non-
Article III tribunals.  But they likely would have little interest in most cases 
heard by non-Article III tribunals, and they would not want to bear the cost 
of hearing those cases.  The states would be able to absorb the costs much 
better than the Article III courts because the state judiciary is significantly 
bigger than the federal judiciary.  “There are approximately 30,000 state 
[court] judges, compared to only 1,700 federal judges,”218 and more than 100 
million new cases are filed each year in the state courts compared with ap-
proximately 400,000 new cases each year in federal court.219 
But the docket increase would still be non-trivial.  And the costs would 
likely fall disproportionately on some states, most likely those with large ur-
ban areas and those near the borders—states that already have heavily bur-
dened judiciaries.  States accordingly may balk at hearing these new cases, 
especially since they derive from federal instead of state law. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of states to refuse 
to hear federal claims.220  It has held that state courts cannot refuse to hear 
federal claims if they hear analogous state claims.221  Thus, a state court can-
not refuse to hear federal battery suits if it has jurisdiction over state battery 
suits.  Nor can states limit their jurisdiction to hear only some federal claims 
of a particular sort—for example, a state cannot agree to hear all 1983 ac-
tions except those brought by prisoners against police officers.222 
But these limitations rest on shaky ground.  Many have criticized these 
decisions as unsupported by the Constitution and inconsistent with federal-
ism.223  States may be willing to challenge them, especially if the composi-
 
 218. FAQ: Judges in the United States, INST. ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS. 3, 
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/judge_faq.pdf.  
 219. Id. 
 220. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740–41 (2009) (holding that New York may not deny a 
federal claim that goes against its own policy because “[a] State’s authority to organize its courts, 
while considerable, remains subject to the strictures of the Constitution”). 
 221. Id. at 740 (“[H]aving made the decision to create courts of general jurisdiction that regularly 
sit to entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal 
claims that it considers at odds with its local policy.”). 
 222. Id. at 741–42 (“Our holding addresses only the unique scheme adopted by the State of New 
York—a law designed to shield a particular class of defendants (correction officers) from a particu-
lar type of liability (damages) brought by a particular class of plaintiffs (prisoners).”). 
 223. Id. at 775 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “whether two claims are ‘analogous’ is rele-
vant only for purposes of determining whether a state jurisdictional statute discriminates against fed-
eral law”). 
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tion of the Supreme Court changes given that the most recent decisions on 
the matter were 5-4.  And even if they remain good law, the increase in state 
court cases from reducing non-Article III jurisdiction may be significant 
enough to push some states to limit their courts’ jurisdiction to hear state and 
federal claims in a way that complies with the Court’s doctrines.224 
If these scenarios seemed like real possibilities, Congress could respond 
by offering states money to expand their courts to hear the extra cases.  The 
upshot would be that Congress would spend money on the states instead of 
on agencies to resolve cases that agencies should not have been resolving in 
the first place.225 
A third option is to abrogate or modify federal claims that non-Article 
III tribunals currently hear.  For example, if one concluded that the court of 
claims could no longer hear particular types of claims against the United 
States, Congress could refuse to waive sovereign immunity for those claims 
instead of pushing them into the Article III or state courts.226 
Closely related, a fourth approach is to change the role of Article I tri-
bunals by removing their ability to exercise judicial power.  Doing so re-
moves the federalism objection to the misuse of federal judicial power.  To 
be sure, the judicial power has historically been not well defined,227 and 
there continues to be disagreement among the justices.228  But as noted 
above, it at least includes the power to enter “dispositive judgments” and to 
render binding constitutional interpretations.  Article I tribunals could ac-
cordingly be prohibited from performing these tasks.  Moreover, federalism 
considerations would provide an additional reason for courts to determine, 
finally, what constitutes the judicial power. 
 
 224. Id. at 776 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It cannot be that New York has forsaken the right to 
withdraw a particular class of claims from its courts’ purview simply because it has created courts of 
general jurisdiction that would otherwise have the power to hear suits for damages against correction 
officers.”).  
 225. But see Pfander, supra note 2, at 656 (“[A] literal interpretation of Article III will not do.  
Literalism promises clear guidelines, and it surely protects judicial independence; it holds that Con-
gress may create lower federal adjudicatory bodies only in accordance with the requirements of Arti-
cle III . . . .  [T]his approach suffers from serious problems of institutional fit.”). 
 226. See Hessick supra note 31, at 749 n.206 (explaining that Congress could waive sovereign 
immunity in the Article III context). 
 227. See Hessick, supra note 31, at 719–20. 
 228. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 743–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for the correct interpre-
tation of the Framers’ intent in granting judicial power in Article III and discussing the history of 
judicial power as support). 
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*** 
Courts have focused on separation of powers in determining the consti-
tutionality of Article I adjudications.  That focus assumes that the division of 
power in Article III exists only to protect the federal government.  But the 
provisions of Article III also protect the states.  Federalism helps to explain 
some doctrines that do not sit comfortable under a separation of powers view 
of Article I adjudication.  Moreover, the failure to consider federalism more 
broadly has resulted in a skewed body of law that overly empowers Article I 
tribunals at the expense of the states. 
